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World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, by
Michael C. Rea. Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 245. Cloth $35.00.
DALE JACQUETTE, The Pennsylvania State University
In an age dominated by the success of technology and the natural sciences, empirical evidence and abductive explanatory power seem to
belong exclusively to philosophical naturalism at the expense of traditional
theisms, while theists seem to have nothing more persuasive than wishful
thinking or a subjective psychological compulsion dressed up as a revelation or religious' experience' to support their belief in the scientifically
unverifiable reality of a divine supernatural being.
Against this common way of thinking about the methodological and
doctrinal inequality dividing theism and atheism, naturalism and supernaturalism, Michael C. Rea argues that naturalism is not a thesis after all,
but a research program, that as such naturalism lacks rational foundation,
and that naturalism suprisingly is committed to rejecting realism about
while offering no adequate basis for accepting the existence of material
objects and other minds. Rea maintains that every thinking human subject
has a research program, without which nothing could count as evidence
even for the most mundane kinds of inquiry. There are individual and
shared research programs, but in both cases research programs can at most
be discarded but can never be adopted on the basis of evidence.
Accordingly, it can never be rational to accept any research program. We
can have good reasons for rejecting a research program, but positive commitment to a research program is never more than a matter of disposition.
Rea's book is divided into three main parts. After an Introduction that
anticipates and summarizes his central conclusions, Part I discusses
Naturalism by outlining selected historical episodes in a chapter on the
'Pillars of Naturalism', from which Rea extracts the salient features of
'Naturalism Characterized'. Part II on Ontology raises difficulties for naturalism as Rea characterizes its research program in chapters on 'The
Discovery Problem', inadequately handled by appeals to 'Proper Function'
and 'Pragmatic Arguments', culminating in the question 'What Price
Antirealism?' Here Rea collects the problems he claims are encountered by
naturalism as antithetical to the existence of material objects and other
minds. Part III, Alternatives, proceeds on the assumption that the defeat of
naturalism in previous sections requires rethinking fundamental assumptions in epistemology. Rea contrasts 'Intuitionism', which he discredits as
a special faculty or intellectual source of knowledge for discovering the
intrinsic modal properties of material objects and justifying the existence
other minds, thus leaving the field exclusively to the only alternative he
supports, a version of 'Supernaturalism', in which he defends the methodological advantages of theism over naturalism.
Rea's distinction between thesis and research program, and the claim
that research programs can never be accepted on the grounds of evidence
is a postmodernist wolf dressed up in analytic sheep's clothing. If an
inquirer justifiably or not believes that there are only two possible research
programs and comes to reject one on the basis of evidence, which Rea
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admits can happen, why would it not be rational to adopt or at least gravitate loward the only remaining alternative? To consider the case directly
relevant to Rea's study, if we think that the origin of the universe can only
be explained by naturalism or supernaturalism, and we come to reject
supernaturalism, say, on the basis of the problem of evil, why would it not
then be rational to adopt naturalism as constituting the only viable
research program of choice? Why, in the first place, should anyone agree
that naturalism is a research program rather than a thesis? Unfortunately,
Rea nowhere explains or tries to define what he means by a thesis as contrasted with a research program. He is satisfied to use these terms and
draw upon what he takes to be their methodologically charged implications without saying precisely what differences are supposed to hold
between them and how they are supposed to be interrelated.
All we learn from Rea's book about the distinction between a thesis and
a research program is that Rea regards naturalism as a research program
rather than a thesis, and that as a research program naturalism necessarily
functions theoretically without rational foundation. We do not even know
enough about Rea's distinction between theses and research programs to
know whether these are the only possibilities for the classification of naturalism, or whether naturalism might instead be an ideology, theory, framework for a thesis, or something else yet again, and if so what ramifications
another categorization might have for Rea's claim that naturalism lacks
rational foundation. Nor does Rea provide examples of genuine philosophical theses for the sake of comparison so that the reader can try to
determine whether a thesis is or is not open to the same limitations as
research programs. We do not even have enough information to know
why or in what sense naturalism is correctly classified as a research program, or whether the argument against its being a thesis can also be adapted to show that naturalism cannot be a research program either. Oddly,
and in a way that we are never in position to assess in Rea's exposition,
naturalism, as the subtitle of his book indicates, despite being a research
program, is nevertheless understood as having consequences like those of
any thesis in terms of which at least its unacceptability can be judged.
Since Rea never says exactly what he means by a thesis, we cannot decide
whether the best alternatives to naturalism are genuine theses that we can
rationally adopt, or other research programs that of necessity are equally
lacking a rational foundation.
When we tum to the question of exactly what might be meant by naturalism, Rea again does say enough. He argues that there is no reasonable
construal of naturalism as a thesis, so that we must classify it instead as a
research program. There is no obvious system to the alternatives Rea considers, however, so we do not know whether he has eliminated all of the
possibilities or overlooked what might otherwise tum out to be the most
promising answers. The mere fact that the literature contains conflicting
accounts of naturalism is interesting but inconclusive for this purpose,
because it might only reflect confusions or differences in perspective about
the concept. A useful way of thinking about naturalism that Rea does not
try to refute formulates naturalism as the thesis that all and only those
putative entities actually exist that are hypothesized, entailed, or presup-
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posed by a correct natural science. This definition avoids the need to
describe naturalism as a research program, which in some sense it also
undoubtedly is, and answers Rea's main objections to naturalism as a
research program that is incompatible with a commitment to the reality of
material objects or other minds.
Where the unexpected implications of naturalism in conflict with materialism and the existence of other minds, Rea offers an interesting but
unpersuasive line of objections. He argues that naturalism is incompatible
with commitment to the reality of material entities because of what he calls
the Discovery Problem. This is the alleged epistemic obstacle uniquely
encountered by naturalism in trying to determine the intrinsic modal properties of material objects. Against the existence of other minds Rea resurrects the frequently discussed problem of sustaining an analogical inference to the existence of another consciousness from the inductively weak
single case basis of the thinker's first person experience of internal mental
states. Later, in the book's final chapter, Rea argues that these defects of
naturalism are surmounted by supernaturalism and the belief (or is it a
thesis?) that the world is the product of divine intelligent design. These are
exciting claims by which Rea's work projects a revolutionary metaphilosophical outlook on the dialectical interrelationships governing far-reaching theoretical constructions in philosophy, science and religion. If his conclusions are correct, Rea's criticisms eliminate an obstruction to and
encourage instead the cultivation of theism and supernaturalism in light of
the epistemic limitations and metaphysical disadvantages he attributes to
philosophical naturalism.
The problem throughout Rea's discussion is its myopic focus on easily if
not succinctly defeated strawmen. When he has refuted these, he still
leaves the strongest contrary and sometimes most obvious opposing views
untouched. Thus, not only does Rea not try to explain what he means by
the key concept of science, but from what he does say it appears that he has
a narrow excessively skewed and to that extent implausible view of what
scientists actually do and what science actually involves. He concludes
that naturalism is incompatible with belief in the existence of material
objects because materialism presupposes that there are intrinsic modal
properties of material entities that cannot be 'detected' by empirical means.
Natural science, however, is ontically committed to the existence of many
kinds of putative entities that do not make their presence known on any
Geiger counter. Science is best construed not merely as a systematization
of observations, but as a structure of hypotheses that support one another
in a mutually justificatory coherence network that is empirically justified in
complicated ways. If we emphasize the hypothetical as well as the observational aspect of natural science, then it is hard to see how can there possibly be any objection to philosophical naturalism as including such hypothetically posited putative entities as material objects, including their
intrinsic modal properties, if any, and other minds. These items, whose
existence Rea does not prove in the first place beyond remarking that they
are widely accepted, do not need to be discovered, but only hypothesized
by a justified application of natural science in order to satisfy the proposed
definition of philosophical naturalism as a bona fide metaphysical thesis.
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In this spirit, it may be worthwhile to look more closely at Rea's argument for the Discovery Problem. Even if it is true that intrinsic modal
properties cannot be empirically detected, this fact does not detract from
naturalism's grounds for commitment to their existence as a reasonable
hypothesis or as entailed or presupposed by the reasonable hypotheses of
natural science. In lieu of a convincing argument by Rea that there are
such modal properties, it might be the better part of naturalism anyway
not to include them in its ontology but to withhold judgment concerning
their existence. Rea, moreover, overlooks an important distinction
betvveen intrinsic logical and intrinsic causal modal properties. It might
better be said that contingently existing material objects do not and cannot
even be imagined to have intrinsic logical modal properties, except in the
trivial sense of having a fortiori the logical possibility of instantiating whatever other logically contingent properties they happen to instantiate, along
with the logical necessity of instantiating tautological properties and not
instantiating logically inconsistent properties.
Despite the nonexistence of intrinsic logical modal properties, and contrary to Rea's argument that naturalism cannot accommodate any intrinsic
modal properties, material objects might nevertheless be said to have and
even in some sense to be defined in terms of their intrinsic causal modal
properties. Intrinsic causal modal properties might be understood as those
a material entity has by virtue of falling under a particular empirically
established causal law, by which some strength of causal rather than logical necessity is implied. Whereas empiricists and naturalists are free to disagree among themselves about whether there can be intrinsic logical
modal properties of material objects, Rea says nothing whatsoever to
exclude the empirical discovery of intrinsic causal modal properties, reasonably attributed at least hypothetically to contingently existent material
objects whenever an appropriate causal law is discovered or confirmed as
applying to certain kinds of material entities. A bullet, accordingly, might
naturally be such that it must be projected through space with a force equal
to it~, mass times its rate of acceleration, given the law of kinematics by
which f = ma, not as a matter of intrinsic logical necessity but of intrinsic
causal modality. A naturalist on this account can easily include any of the
usual candidates for causally modal dispositional properties that are
empirically justified, such as the property of being brittle, soluble, or the
like. All we seem to need is the good old-fashioned covering law model in
the natural sciences, while the Discovery Problem as an epistemic obstacle
to reliably determining the logical or causal modal properties of material
entities does not seem to be resolved in any way by the proposition that
the world is designed by a divine supernatural being.
As for Rea's conclusion that the naturalist is inherently prohibited from
justified commitment to the existence of other minds because of the problem of supporting an inductive inference from a single first-person case,
the objection here is also circumvented by the hypothesizing role of science
and by the observation that many kinds of inductive generalizations are
epistemically warranted by single instances. A child is right to avoid burning its fingers on the basis of an induction from a single case after only one
encounter with a flame, and logicians are right, as George Boole and others
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have maintained, to accept the rule of modus ponens as deductively valid
in every application after reflecting on only a single clearcut example.
Why not then in the defeasible refutation of ontic solipsism?
The endorsement of theism and of the existence of an intelligent designer lacks depth in Rea's concluding chapter, because he does not consider
theism as a thesis or research program in light of the same kinds of objections to which he subjects naturalism. A balanced account that could
enable an impartial reader to judge the pros and cons of naturalism versus
supernaturalism would need to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
supernaturalism only after raising comparably motivated criticisms on
both sides. Rea presents us with detailed objections to naturalism from
which he suggests that only supernaturalism can rescue metaphysics. The
problems with supernaturalism, however, beginning with but by no means
limited to the epistemic inaccessibility of the divine, are potentially even
more damaging to its prospects than any of the difficulties Rea raises
against naturalism. Rea speaks indeed of supernaturalism overcoming
naturalism merely by virtue of adopting the justified belief through a particular kind of religious experience that there is a divine supernatural
designer of the universe who has ensured that there is an epistemically
reliable connection between what it is theoretically useful for us to believe
and what is in fact true. If anything, the justificatory burdens, possibilities
for error, misconceptions and paradoxes appear enormously greater in
Rea's characterization of supernaturalism as a solution to relatively pedestrian metaphysical problems about the existence of material objects and
their modal properties and the existence of other minds than philosophy
encounters in even the most naive forms of naturalism.
Rea clearly has a theistic axe to grind in metaphysics. He wants to discredit naturalism because it stands in the way of belief in God. He softpedals this conclusion in several places, stating that he hopes only to convince some naturalists to 'jump ship', holding short of the claim that he has
decisively disproved naturalism or rigorously demonstrated the necessary
truth of any form of supernaturalism. But it is peculiar in the first place for
Rea to oppose theism and naturalism, when we recall that in the eighteenth century the argument from design for the existence of God was
known by proponents and critics alike as natural theology or natural religion. Rea reminds us in one place that naturalists need not be atheists,
despite their close affirnity, but he argues that naturalism as he understands the concept is incompatible with the view that the world is designed
or the handiwork of a divine intelligent supernatural designer. Rea is well
aware of the eighteenth century connection between theism and naturalism, but he tailors his cursory survey of the history of naturalism to begin
only from the mid-nineteenth century onward, thereby avoiding a host of
interesting questions about naturalism and belief in the existence of God.
If we think of naturalism in a less constrained way, then we need not
exclude William Paley and David Hume as naturalists interested in the
question of God's existence, who are willing to consider the implications of
the natural science of their day for the hypothesis that the order that prevails in the natural world as revealed by empirical inquiry might or even
must be the direct result of intelligent design. The lack of any prior basis in
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Rea's account for deciding what is and what is not a proper example of
naturalism haunts his discussion, and leaves a mystery surrounding his
choice of John Dewey and W.V. Quine as his paradigm naturalists, to the
exclusion of Franz Brentano, Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Ryle,
David Armstrong, among numerously many others, even within the narrowly circumscribed historical period to which Rea limits his overview.
The problems besetting the argument in Rea's critique of naturalism
make it hard to recommend the book on its philosophical merits. The
questions it raises are nevertheless important and enduring. Whatever
confusions pervade the work, Rea presents a remarkable dialectical confrontation between approaches to the philosophy of science and religion,
betv-.'een naturalism and supernaturalism, that is certain to provoke continuing debate and to enliven the perennial dispute concerning these fundamentally opposed ways of understanding the natural world with or without design.

